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Maturana’s ‘Coordination’ and
Sartre’s ‘Reflection’ around Naming
Seiichi Imoto*
Independent Researcher, Sapporo, Japan
‘Behavioral coordination’ theory of language of Maturana (1928–) does not give a
clear explanation for the questions of how naming takes place and where a word
adequate for our experience comes from. This flaw may be alleviated by Sartre (1905–
1980)s ‘reflection’ theory. According to Sartre’s theory, we can make two types of
sentences from the same data: for example, “I am conscious of this chair” and “There is
consciousness of this chair.” The difference between the two sentences is the existence
of ‘I’ in the first or its lack in the second. Where did ‘I’ come from or how was it removed?
There must be a field in which ‘I’ is brought forth, and it may also be a field where naming
can take place. This essay concerns a naming process with special reference to Sartre’s
philosophy. At first, Maturana’s biology and his linguistic theory are explained, and
Sartre’s fundamental ontology and in relation to this, his theory of reflection (two types
of reflection) are introduced. Next, Sartre’s notions of language (words and naming) are
explained. Then, after operational correspondences between Maturana’s ‘coordination’
and Sartre’s ‘reflection’ are examined, our primary questions are answered. Finally,
constraints burdened on our cognition with language and the possibility of liberation
from them are discussed. Main arguments: (1) Maturana’s ‘coordination’ and Sartre’s
‘reflection’ are operationally equivalent concepts; (2) Sartre can complement Maturana’s
languaging theory of naming by providing both the domain for naming (the domain for
the synthesis of identification, or for universalizing synthesis) and a mediator of naming
(the cogito, namely the consciousness, of a languaging person).
Keywords: J.-P. Sartre, H. R. Maturana, languaging, naming, coordination, pure reflection, impure reflection,
synthesis of identification
INTRODUCTION: PROPOSITION OF THE PROBLEM
Maturana and Sartre — most readers may be surprised or perplexed with this juxtaposition. At
ﬁrst glance, commonsensically, they don’t seem to have anything to share. However, actually they
have many commonalities: religiously they are both atheists, and politically both are anarchists
seeking for love or solidarity among people. Moreover, in their work the two are fundamentally
phenomenological ontologists, and they share many common problematics: the nature of
perception, illusion, imagination, and emotion; phenomenological ontology of consciousness, self
(the ego) and self-consciousness, and so on.
I have been studying Maturana’s work for years (cf. “The logic of Maturana’s biology,” 2011;
“What is H. Maturana’s ‘Languaging’?,” 2013, inter alia). It is when I began to examine Maturana’s
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notions of ‘emotion’ and ‘emotioning’ that I encountered Sartre’s
work, and consequently I found many commonalities between
them as noted above.
Maturana’s ‘biology’ is not an ordinary biology as a natural
science. It should be called meta-biology or second-order biology.
Usually its description is abstract, formal, and lacks concrete
examples. In the meanwhile, I found Sartre’s description could
give us vivid and concrete examples to ﬂesh out some of
Maturana’s notions. For example, the notion of ‘structural
coupling’: the dynamics of congruent structural changes that
take place spontaneously between systems in recurrent (in fact
recursive) interactions (Maturana, 2002, p. 17). We can have a
vivid experience of the structural coupling by reading Sartre’s
following sentences in his Being and Nothingness (Sartre, 2003,
pp. 605–606).
The skier makes it [=the snow] produce what it can produce;
the homogeneous, solid matter releases for him a solidity and
homogeneity only through the act of the sportsman, but this
solidity and this homogeneity dwell as properties enclosed in the
matter. This synthesis of self and not-self which the sportsman’s
action here realizes is expressed, as in the case of speculative
knowledge and the work of art, by the aﬃrmation of the right of
the skier over the snow. It is my ﬁeld of snow; I have traversed
it a 100 times, a 100 times I have through my speed eﬀected the
birth of this force of condensation and support; it is mine. (italics
in original)
“It is my ﬁeld of snow and the snow is mine!” I think this
is a very beautiful expression of Maturana’s notion of structural
coupling. Through that, it can be said that Sartre complemented
Maturana very eﬀectively. This can be the case with Maturana’s
other problematics. As one of them, I have adopted a linguistic
problem, that is, the problem of naming.
Maturana’s Behavioral Coordination
Theory of Language
In his talk with Poerksen, Maturana spoke about his behavioral
coordination theory of language (Maturana and Poerksen, 2004,
p. 91).
I claim that whenever we encounter a recursive coordination
of behavior, that is, a ﬂow in coordination of coordinations of
behavior, we see that something new arises, namely, language.
As language arises, objects arise, e.g., the taxis. What is a taxi?
What I say is that carrying and driving around passengers as a
conﬁguration of behavior coordinated by the second coordination
of behavior (ﬁrst recursion), becomes that conﬁguration of
behavior that in a third coordination of behavior (second
recursion) appears “named” taxi. This means that objects arise
as coordinations of coordinations of behavior that obscure the
behaviors that they coordinate (as taxi obscures carrying).
Maturana’s ‘language’ means ‘coordinations of coordinations
of behavior’ in the consensual domain, therefore, it is also
properly called ‘languaging.’ In languaging, the ﬁrst coordination
of behavior brings forth ‘carrying and driving around passengers,’
the second ‘an object (as a would-be taxi),’ and the third ‘an
object named taxi.’ Here, I have two questions: (1) Where did
the name ‘taxi’ come from? Was it created from scratch through
those coordinations, or was it found somewhere and borrowed
to apply to the object?; (2) Who coordinated and named the
object as ‘taxi’? Since languaging is not a natural phenomenon,
the phenomenon of naming will not occur spontaneously or
automatically; some subject (agent) has to be involved in that
process. To my knowledge, Maturana’s description of languaging
has never seriously concerned such problems in naming.
Sartre’s Two Types of Sentences derived
from the Same Data
Let’s assume there is a chair in front of Sartre. He makes two
sentences from that same situation (Sartre, 2011, p. 16).
(1) I am conscious of this chair.
(2) There is consciousness of this chair.
The diﬀerence between these sentences is the existence of ‘I’
in the sentence (1), or its lack in the sentence (2). What makes
this diﬀerence? Where does ‘I’ come from? Or how can ‘I’ be
removed?
The naming of ‘taxi’ and the appearance and disappearance
of ‘I’ may be connected. There may be a ﬁeld in which ‘I’ is
brought forth and the naming of ‘taxi’ may also take place.
Sartre’s philosophy could explain this problem and complement
Maturana’s behavioral coordination theory of language.
MATURANA’S ‘BIOLOGY’ (see Imoto,
2011, 2013)
Maturana’s ‘biology’ or a second-order biology is a philosophy
of structural determinism. It is embodied in a composite entity
called a ‘structure-determined system’ with two non-intersecting
domains – the domain of interactions and the domain of the
composition of components – which can be called the core
structure or core logic of his biology. From the perspective of
the history of western thoughts, Aristotle and Schopenhauer
can be regarded as good candidates as precursors of Maturana’s
work, and his work can be characterized as an advanced form
of Aristotle’s hylomorphism (Aristotle, 1984), depicted on the
horizon of Schopenhauer’s world of ‘Vorstellung’ (representation
or bringing-forth; Schopenhauer, 1966, 1997).
By putting two organisms and their niche (which are
all structure-determined systems) into a historical process,
Maturana develops his core logic of the structure-determined
system, letting biological phenomena (for example, language)
arise from them in the domain of interactions of the observer.
All the ﬁndings observed by the observer, hence, exist under the
consciousness of the observer observing, in other words, on the
same epistemological horizon as that of Schopenhauer’s world of
Vorstellung. Ontologically Maturana’s universe is composed of
the observer’s consciousness and his all ﬁndings observed under
his consciousness. This ontological structure is fundamentally the
same as that of Sartre’s which is described later.
Maturana developed a quite unique theory of language.
He wrote (Maturana, 1995, p. 155): when an observer sees
two organisms in a ﬂow of recurrent interaction that he or
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she can describe as consensual coordinations of consensual
coordinations of behavior, those two organisms operate in
language. Thus, according to him, our language occurs in
languaging as a ﬂow of living together in coordinations of
coordinations of consensual doings (actions or behaviors) in the
domain of interactions (or in the consensual social domain).
Languaging as Organization of Language
What is the nature of ‘languaging,’ or what kind of status does
it take in Maturana’s system of language? Maturana writes about
‘natural language’ as follows (Maturana, 1980, pp. 30–31).
The understanding of the evolutionary origin of natural languages
requires the recognition in them of a basic biological function
which, properly selected, could originate them. So far this
understanding has been impossible because language has been
considered as a denotative symbolic system for the transmission
of information. In fact, if such were the biological function of
language, its evolutionary origin would demand the pre-existence
of the function of denotation as necessary to develop the symbolic
system for the transmission of information, but this function
is the very one whose evolutionary origin should be explained.
Conversely, if it is recognized that language is connotative and
not denotative and that its function is to orient the orientee within
his cognitive domain, and not to point to independent entities, it
becomes apparent that learned orienting interactions embody a
function of non-linguistic origin that, under a selective pressure
for recursive application, can originate through evolution the
system of cooperative consensual interactions between organisms
that is natural language. (italics by s.i.)
For Maturana, ‘natural language’ is ‘the system of cooperative
consensual interactions between organisms,’ in other words, it is
the ‘languaging’ as ‘coordinations of coordinations of consensual
doings,’ and thus, without languaging there will be neither
languages nor even symbolic systems. An explanation is, for him,
the proposition of a generative mechanism or process which,
if allowed to operate, gives rise, as a result of its operation, to
the phenomenon or experience to be explained. So, he proposed
the autopoietic organization as the generative mechanism that
brings forth living phenomena of living systems in their niche,
and the closed circular neuronal organization of the operation
of the nervous system as the generative mechanism that brings
forth and modulates sensory-motor (or eﬀector) correlations,
hence behaviors, in the organism. Thus, to ﬁnd a generative
mechanism in a system in question is to ﬁnd an organization as
an identity or essence of the system. Languaging, then, as a basic
biological function in the domain of interactions, is the generative
mechanism or the organization as essence of the linguistic system
in general and of the human language system in particular.
Maturana’s Linguistic Theory
Maturana summarized his linguistic theory as follows (Maturana,
2008, pp. 19–20).
(1) If we attend to what we do in language, we will realize that
language occurs as a ﬂow of living together in coordinations
of coordinations of consensual doings. That is, we will
realize that language occurs as languaging, in the ﬂow of
our living together in recursive consensual coordinations of
doings. Language has the concreteness of the doings in the
domain of doings [=the domain of interactions] in which
we coordinate our doings.
(2) Objects, entities, notions, ideas, concepts, etc., arise as
coordinations of coordinations of doings, and do not exist
otherwise. Meanings of words, sentences, signs, and symbols
are not in them, but in the ﬂow of coordinations of
doings that they coordinate. And a word can have as many
diﬀerent meanings as there are diﬀerent ﬂows of recursive
coordinations of doings in which the word participates.
(3) When a child learns to name an object he or she does not
learn to name a preexisting entity, but learns a ﬂow of
recursive coordinations of doings with languaging persons
with which he or she may be living. So a baby that learns the
[name of] ball, learns balling [ball-ing], and when he or she
learns the [name of] doll, learns dolling [doll-ing]. Thus, the
baby learns them as manners of living together with other
human beings in consensual coordinations of doings.
The item (3) above provokes in me the same questions as
noted in the case of ‘taxi’: (a) where do such words (or names),
‘ball’ and ‘doll,’ come from in his linguistic theory? Why can
Maturana name those doings, balling and dolling, as such? Can
the consensual coordinations of doings create such words as ‘ball’
and ‘doll’? Or, are there already such words as the given in the
consensual domain of interactions for children to be able to learn
and use them?; (b) If a word (ball) and its meaning (ball-ing) are
given there, do they combine automatically or isn’t some agent
required to combine them? Maturana’s account of naming as the
(3) above seems insuﬃcient to me. If the languaging is truly the
generativemechanism or the organization of the natural language
system, it should give a clearer account of the emergence of words
or of naming.
SARTRE’S PHILOSOPHY
Now I refer to Sartre’s work “The Transcendence of the Ego: A
Sketch for a Phenomenological Description” which was published
in 1937. Although this is one of his earliest works, we can already
ﬁnd in it his fundamental philosophical principles underlying
evenhis latermajor works such as “Being andNothingness” (1943)
and “ Critique of Dialectical Reason, Volume One” (1960).
Ontology
He began “The Transcendence of the Ego” by writing as follows
(Sartre, 2011, p. 1).
For most philosophers, the Ego is an ‘inhabitant’ of consciousness.
Some of them state that it is formally present at the heart
of ‘Erlebnisse [lived experiences],’ as an empty principle of
uniﬁcation. Others – psychologists, for the most part – claim they
can discover its material presence, as a center of desires and acts,
in every moment of our psychical life. I should like to show here
that the Ego is neither formally nor materially in consciousness: it
is outside, in the world; it is a being in the world, like the Ego of
another. (italics in original)
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He exiled the Ego from the consciousness to the world outside
it (in Maturana’s terms, it can be rephrased like this: Sartre exiled
the Self from the domain of the composition of components to
the domain of interactions). Thus, the consciousness was cleaned
and puriﬁed. He wrote in the ﬁrst part of the Conclusion of that
book as follows (Sartre, 2011, p. 43).
(1) The transcendental ﬁeld [=the consciousness, by s.i.],
puriﬁed of all egological structure, recovers its former
limpidity. In one sense, it is a nothing, since all physical,
psycho-physical and psychical objects, all truths, and all
values are outside it, since the me has, for its part, ceased
to be part of it. But this nothing is everything because it is
the consciousness of all these objects. (. . .) But, in addition,
we have to note that, from this point of view,my feelings and
my states [of mind], my Ego itself, cease to be my exclusive
property. (italics in original)
For Sartre, the two domains, that is, the consciousness
(my consciousness) and the world outside it, constitute all
the universe of human existence. What is important here is
that the consciousness is the consciousness of the world. The
world contains everything except my consciousness: not only
all the physical and psycho-physical but also all the truths
(e.g., mathematical truths) and values, and in addition, the Ego
(the I and the me) and its related feelings and states, and all
other psychical objects are all existents in the world, not in my
consciousness. As a result, he refuted the solipsism.
The Ego appears to reﬂection as a transcendent object in the
world (Sartre, 2011, p. 28). The Ego, the unity of transcendent
unities such as mental states, qualities and actions, is itself a
transcendent, and appears only in the world of reﬂection (Sartre,
2011, p. 21).
Consciousness is deﬁned by intentionality, through which, in
Sartre’s terms, it transcends itself to the intentional object; the
object is transcendent to the consciousness that grasp it, and it
is within the object that its unity is found (Sartre, 2011, p. 6).
Thus, he reaches the last part of his Conclusion (Sartre, 2011,
p. 51).
(3) It is suﬃcient for theme to be contemporary with theWorld
and for the subject-object duality, which is purely logical,
to disappear deﬁnitively from philosophical preoccupations.
The World did not create the me, and the me did not create
the World, they are two objects for the absolute, impersonal
[which means ‘without the Ego,’ by s.i.] consciousness, and
it is through that consciousness that they are linked back
together. (italics in original)
He could exile, in addition to the solipsism, the subject-object
duality as only logical. Now here are the absolute, impersonal
consciousness in one side, and the Ego and the world in the other
side: in reﬂection, the consciousness brings forth the Ego into the
outside world, both of which are supported by the impersonal
consciousness. Simply put, as noted above, Sartre’s ontology is
composed of the two ﬁelds: my consciousness and the world
outside my consciousness, in other words, the world and my
consciousness of it.
The ontological situation for Maturana is generally the same
as that for Sartre. Everything arises in languaging coordinations:
in addition to objects, ideas, concepts, etc., the observer (the
self), consciousness, self-consciousness are brought forth in the
consensual domain of interactions (Maturana, 1992, 1995). And,
since it is the observer that sees all these entities, the world
appears as the world of Vorstellung of Schopenhauer (1966,
1997) to the observer’s consciousness. This ontological structure
for Maturana fundamentally the same as that of Sartre’s noted
above.
Two Types of Reflection
Sartre distinguishes two types of reﬂection, impure and pure.
When these two reﬂections apprehend the same, certain data,
impure reﬂection aﬃrms more than it knows (a process called
‘inﬁnitization’ or ‘universalization’), but pure reﬂection stays with
the given (no inﬁnitization; Sartre, 2011, p. 23).
In Being and Nothingness Sartre referred to the two types of
reﬂection as follows (Sartre, 2003, p. 182).
Here, we must distinguish between pure reﬂection and impure or
constituent reﬂection, for it is impure reﬂection which constitutes
the succession of psychic facts or psyche. What is given ﬁrst in
daily life is impure or constituent reﬂection although this includes
pure reﬂection as its original structure. But pure reﬂection can
be attained only as the result of a modiﬁcation which it [impure
reﬂection, by s.i.] eﬀects on itself and which is in the form of a
katharsis. (italics in original)
So, reﬂection is usually carried out in the following sequence:
(1) pure reﬂection, which is mostly hidden, (2) impure reﬂection
which includes the (1) as its original structure, and (3) pure, or
rather purifying, reﬂection in the form of a katharsis (actually
in the form of phenomenological reduction or bracketing oﬀ the
Ego).
Let’s see a concrete example to clearly understand the
reﬂection process, especially of the (1) and (2) above. Sartre shows
us a reﬂective experience of hatred as follows (Sartre, 2011, pp.
22–23). You will also see what he meant by ‘inﬁnitization.’
Let us consider a reﬂective experience of hatred. I see Peter, I feel a
kind of profound upheaval of revulsion and anger on seeing him (I
am already on the reﬂective level); this upheaval is consciousness.
I cannot be in error when I say: I feel at this moment a violent
revulsion toward Peter. But is this experience of revulsion hatred?
Obviously not. It is in any case not given as such. After all, I have
hated Peter for a long time and I think I always will hate him. So
an instantaneous consciousness of revulsion cannot be my hatred.
(. . .) I would say: ‘I feel revulsion for Peter at this moment,’ and
in this way I will not implicate the future. But precisely because of
this refusal to implicate the future, I would cease to hate.
Butmy hatred appears tome at the same time asmy experience
of revulsion. But it appears through this experience. It is given
precisely as not being limited to this experience. It is given, in
and by each movement of disgust, revulsion and anger, but at the
same time it is not any of them, it goes beyond each of them
as it aﬃrms its permanence. (. . .) This is enough, it seems to
me, for one to be able to aﬃrm that hatred is not a form of
consciousness. It extends beyond the instantaneous moment of
consciousness (. . .). Hatred is thus a transcendent object. Each
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Erlebnis reveals it in its entirety but at the same time is merely a
proﬁle of it, a projection (an Abschattung). Hatred is a letter of
credit for an infinity of angry or revulsed consciousnesses, in
the past and future. It is the transcendent unity of that inﬁnity of
consciousnesses. So, to say ‘I hate’ or ‘I love’ on the occasion of a
singular consciousness of attraction or revulsion is to perform a
veritable inﬁnitization, somewhat analogous to the one we carry
out when we perceive an inkwell or the blue of the blotter. (italics
in original; boldface by s.i.)
Revulsion is a revulsed consciousness; hatred is in the ﬁeld
outside consciousness as a psychical state, as a transcendent
object. Revulsion is in instantaneousness of time; hatred in
inﬁnitization or in inﬁnity, independent of time. Impure
reﬂection (hatred), thus, includes pure reﬂection (revulsion)
as its original structure. The step (3) of reﬂection, purifying
reﬂection, is to take the impure reﬂection back into its original
instantaneous character, in other words, into the level of original
unreﬂected consciousness.
SARTRE’S VIEW OF LANGUAGE
Words
Sartre regards words and language in general as a kind of
‘pratico-inertia’ (matter in which human past praxis is embodied
as inertia). They are in the practico-inert ﬁeld of the ﬁeld outside
consciousness, surrounding and conditioning us (Sartre, 2004,
p. 324).
Every word is external to everyone, it lives outside as a public
institution (Sartre, 2004, p. 98). But language is the product
of human history (Sartre, 2004, p. 99), so its materiality as
an inert totality is a constantly developing organic totalization
(Sartre, 2004, p. 98). So, we can say that the practico-inert ﬁeld
which contains words and language, is, in Maturana’s terms, in
the consensual domain of interactions, in which all aspects of
language (lexis, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics) have been
brought forth and developed as an organic totalization.
Naming
Three Requisites for the Commencement of
Language
Here, I would like to refer to “There and Back” (Aller et Retour).
This is Sartre’s essay on language presented in the form of a
critique on Parain (1897–1971)’s Recherches sur la nature et les
functions du language (Paris: Gallimar, 1942). In this essay, Sartre
argues three requisites for language: the cogito, the universalizing
synthesis, and the Other (Sartre, 2010a, p. 368).
Against Parain, then, we must maintain the priority of the cogito,
of universalizing syntheses, and of immediate experience of the
Other. In this way, we restore language to its true place. (italics in
original)
What is the cogito in this case? It is the consciousness, the
being-for-itself, which brings forth the ‘I’ in the ﬁeld outside it.
Sartre explains (Sartre, 2010a, pp. 363–365).
[T]he word, the sole word in question is there before me as that
which is understood. (. . .) [T]he consciousness of understanding
is the law of being of understanding. I shall call this the silence of
consciousness. (. . .) [T]hat silence that I am, by which, however,
there is a language and there is a world. (italics in original;
boldface by s.i.)
Through me (i.e., my consciousness, the cogito), there are the
world and language in it. This is the same structure as was noted
above, i.e., there are the Ego and the world, which are linked back
together by the consciousness, the cogito. In Maturana’s terms,
this consciousness (the cogito) can be that of a languaging person
as far as languaging is concerned. Thus, his or her cogito turns
out to be a mediator through which the world and language are
linked back together.
Then, Sartre asked: which is ﬁrst, the Other or language?
(Sartre, 2010a, p. 365). He replied that language is being-for-
others: the Other – any other – comes in between me [the
cogito, my consciousness] and everything I am on Earth – happy,
unhappy, handsome, ugly, mean or magnanimous, for the Other
must play a part before I can be any of those things (Sartre, 2010a,
p. 367). He further noted (Sartre, 2010a, p. 366):
But if I exist originally only by and for the Other, if, as soon as I
appear, I am thrown before the Other’s gaze; and if the Other is
a thing as certain to me as I am myself, then I am language, for
language is merely existence in the presence of someone else. (. . .)
In a word, for there to be a problem of language, the Other must
ﬁrst be given.
For Sartre’s linguistic view, the existence of other persons is
one of the requisites for language. This is also the case with
Maturana, because languaging requires at least two persons.
Domain of Naming
The last requisite to note for language is universalizing synthesis.
This is the very phase of naming for which Maturana has never
given a clear explanation. The domain of universalizing syntheses
is just the domain of naming. Sartre asks (Sartre, 2010a, p. 308),
“How is one to insert into language an experience that was made
without it?” In order to do that, we need a synthetic domain
of identiﬁcation between language and experiences (objects,
concepts, or things). Sartre explains (Sartre, 2010a, pp. 361–363).
[E]ven if the word existed in the heart of God, I would have to
produce it by the operation termed ‘synthesis of identification.’
And I now understand that the word wasn’t privileged, since I
have also to make the table and the tree and the cockchafer bug
exist as permanent syntheses of relatively stable properties. It isn’t
by naming them that I confer objectivity on them, but I cannot
name them unless I have already constituted them as independent
units or, in other words, unless I objectify both the thing and the
word in a single synthetic act that names it. (. . .) [I]t is I [the
cogito], whether listening or speaking, who constitute the word
as one of the elements of my experience. (. . .) [U]ltimately, if
I constitute my experience and words within that experience, it
isn’t at the level of language, but at the level of the synthesis of
identiﬁcation that the universal appears. When I say, ‘I’m hungry,’
then clearly the word universalizes; but in order to universalize, it
must ﬁrst be the case that I [the cogito] individualize it, that is to
say, that I extract the word ‘hungry’ from the disordered confusion
of my current impressions. (italics in original; boldface by s.i.)
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For naming to occur, it is necessary that there is a domain
for universalizing synthesis, or a domain for synthesis of
identiﬁcation where the universal appears, in which there
must be the thing (independent unit, object, or concept),
the word ﬁtting it, and the cogito, ‘I,’ that extract the
word and the thing for a synthetic act of identiﬁcation.
The thing and the word are all inhabitants in the ﬁeld
outside consciousness, and therefore, the domain for
universalizing synthesis or simply the domain of naming
is also in that ﬁeld outside consciousness, which are all
supported in impure reﬂection through the consciousness (the
cogito).
We need the cogito, the consciousness of a languaging
person, as a mediator between language and experiences (objects,
concepts, or things) to insert them into language, or in other
words, to connect experiences with words, or simply put, to name
experiences using words. Even if there are only experiences and
words, they cannot automatically give rise to the phenomenon
of naming. Naming needs a mediator, namely, the cogito of a
languaging person.
Such are what Maturana lacks in his languaging theory
of naming. In his own account of naming, he has referred
neither to the involvement of the cogito in the naming
process, nor to the presence of the domain of the synthesis
of identiﬁcation or the domain of universalizing synthesis.
Sartre can complement Maturana’s languaging theory of
naming by providing both the domain for the synthesis of
identiﬁcation, namely the domain of naming, and the cogito
(the consciousness) of a languaging person as a mediator of
naming.
Words are situated between objects and the cogito of a
languaging person who names them. Hence, Sartre argues (Sartre,
2010a, p. 372), “language can lie, deceive, distort, and make
unwarranted generalizations: the questions it raises are technical,
political, esthetic, and moral.” Thus, naming can be dangerously
a multi-faced project.
OPERATIONAL CORRESPONDENCE
BETWEEN MATURANA’S
‘COORDINATION’ AND SARTRE’S
‘REFLECTION’
Literal Explanation
Now I would like to show the equivalence as operational concepts
between Maturana’s ‘coordination’ and Sartre’s ‘reﬂection.’ At
ﬁrst, it can be explained literally, which takes a chain of
equivalences as follows: coordination of behavior (action, doing)
(Maturana)= coordination of distinction (Maturana)= positing
(Sartre) = reﬂection (Sartre).
Maturana (1992, p. 93) wrote:
I speak of coordinations of actions or coordinations of
distinctions, depending whether I want to emphasize what
takes place in the interaction in relation to the participants
(coordination of actions), or what takes place in the interaction
in relation to an environment (coordination of distinctions).
In a strict sense, the participants are also the environment,
and the environment the participants. Hence, ‘coordination of
actions’ and ‘coordination of distinctions’ are fundamentally
equivalent.
Sartre (2010b, p. 187) wrote:
[E]very existent, as soon as it is posited, is consequently surpassed.
But still it must be surpassed toward something. (italics in original)
In order to posit something, it must be distinguished, namely,
in Sartre’s terms, it must be surpassed toward the something, or
it transcends itself to the intentional object, and in order to be
distinguished, it must be posited; so, positing is distinction, and
vice versa.
In Sartre’s writing, ‘positing,’ ‘thesis,’ and ‘reﬂection’ have
equivalent usage (meaning) like such expressions as ‘positional
(or thetic, reﬂective) self-consciousness’ (Cox, 2008, p. 189).
Hence, ‘positing’ is equivalent to ‘reﬂection.’
Therefore, entirely viewing, Maturana’s ‘coordination’ turns
out equivalent to Sartre’s ‘reﬂection.’
Substantial Explanation
In addition to the literal explanation above, another type of
explanation which can be called a substantial explanation is
possible to show the equivalence of Maturana’s ‘coordination’ and
Sartre’s ‘reﬂection.’
Sartre said, as quoted above, that every existent, as soon as it is
posited, is consequently surpassed. But still it must be surpassed
toward something (italics in original; boldface by s.i.). Maturana
describes this process as follows (Maturana, 1992, p. 92).
[B]ecause an observer can describe such a domain of recurrent
interactions in semantic terms, by referring the diﬀerent
coordinations of actions (or distinctions) involved to the
diﬀerent consequences that they have in the domain in which they
are distinguished, I also call a consensual domain of interactions a
linguistic domain. [boldface by s.i.]
Simply put, this quote can be that the coordination of actions
(or distinctions) is referred to its consequence. For example,
‘balling’ (as a meaning) as the coordination of actions (or
distinctions) is referred to ‘ball’ (as a word) as its consequence.
In Sartre’s terms, as soon as a meaning (as an existent) is posited,
it is consequently surpassed toward a word (as another existent)
that will take that meaning. Again in Maturana’s terms, this
process can be expressed like this: words obscure their meanings
(Maturana, 1995, pp. 154–155). Generally speaking, the product
(consequence) obscures its process (actions or distinctions)
through which it is brought forth.
Now we could recognize that Maturana’s ‘coordination’ and
Sartre’s ‘reﬂection’ are operationally equivalent concepts.
Actual Operational Correspondences
(1) Maturana’s ﬁrst coordination and Sartre’s pure reﬂection:
as we saw above, Maturana’s ﬁrst coordination of behavior
results in a conﬁguration of behavior such as ‘carrying.’ This
can be compared to Sartre’s pure reﬂection which impure
reﬂection includes as its original structure or to the level of
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unreﬂected consciousness, that is, the ﬁeld of Erlebnis, lived
experience.
(2) Maturana’s second coordination (ﬁrst recursion) and Sartre’s
impure reﬂection: Maturana’s second coordination (ﬁrst
recursion) yields objects unnamed yet, e.g., an object of
a would-be taxi. This can be compared to Sartre’s impure
reﬂection which brings forth the ﬁeld of objects including ‘all
physical, psycho-physical and psychical objects, all truths,
and all values’ and words as practico-inertia.
(3) Maturana’s third coordination (second recursion) and
Sartre’s universalizing synthesis: the third coordination
(second recursion) of Maturana’s produces named objects:
an object of a would-be taxi becomes a taxi so named. So,
this stage of Maturana is for naming. Sartre’s universalizing
synthesis is also for naming, and it is at this stage that Sartre
complements Maturana’s behavioral coordination theory of
language.
(4) Maturana’s further coordinations (recursions) and Sartre’s
purifying reﬂection: Maturana’s coordination process
increases up to the seventh coordination (sixth recursion),
ﬁnally yielding ‘freedom,’ without returning back to the
lower stages (Maturana et al., 1995). Thus, his coordination
process does not take into account any purifying process
as Sartre’s purifying reﬂection which will lead to a deep
comprehension of a concept (word) in question.
REVISITING THE PRIMARY QUESTIONS
Maturana’s Case
In the ﬁrst section of this paper, I asked: (1) Where did the name
‘taxi’ come from? (2) Who coordinated and named the object as
‘taxi’?
The answer to (1) should be: it was found somewhere and
borrowed to apply to the object. The name ‘taxi’ was not newly
invented but found, and the ‘somewhere’ should be a cultural
environment in the consensual domain of interactions where
there had been a name ‘taxi’ as a consensual element, namely as a
practio-inertia.
The answer to (2): it must be ‘we’ who did it, because as
Maturana said in the quote: whenever we encounter a recursive
coordination of behavior (. . .). This ‘we,’ however, is the ‘we’ in
general, then, it turns out to be the cogito of the observer, or in a
more strict sense, the cogito of Maturana himself.
In the example of ‘ball’-balling or ‘doll’-dolling noted above,
there are a child (or a baby) and languaging persons with whom
he or she may be living. Those latter persons are most probably
his or her parents. Whoever they are, it is sure they already know
the words, ‘ball’ and ‘doll.’ They use (pronounce) these words
when they play the ball-ing or doll-ing with their child (or baby),
thus, the child (or the baby) learns the name ‘ball’ or ‘doll’ with
its meaning as the doing, ball-ing or doll-ing. The words already
exist as the given together with his or her parents. In doing the
play of ball-ing or doll-ing, it is the cogito of the child (or the
baby), not the cogito of his or her parents, that connects the
name with its meaning in the domain of universalizing synthesis
(Sartre) which is the domain lacking in Maturana’s languaging
theory. As already noted above, in his own account of naming,
Maturana has referred neither to the necessity of the cogito
of a languaging person, nor to the presence of the domain of
universalizing synthesis.
Sartre’s domain of universalizing synthesis can complement
Maturana’s lack as the domain of naming. Sartre’s domain
of universalizing synthesis is in the social domain or in the
consensual domain of interactions in Maturana’s terms. In this
manner, the two linguistic theories of Maturana and Sartre are
well-ﬁtted each other and there’s no category mistake between
them.
Maturana proposed the languaging as the generative
mechanism of natural languages such as English, Spanish,
Chinese, and Japanese. These natural languages have their own
lexis, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. Therefore, Maturana’s
theory, languaging, has to be able to explain their emergence,
especially the emergence of lexis (words) and semantics (e.g.,
naming) as the most basic constituents of natural languages,
which Sartre gave us as described in Section “Sartre’s View of
Language.”
It seems to be a mystery that Maturana did not include a
detailed explanation for naming into his behavioral coordination
theory of language, because naming itself is obviously a kind of
behavior, and it is an indispensable stage for linguistics.
Sartre’s Case
The question was what made the diﬀerence between the two
sentences whose cognitive contents were the same. The sentences
were: (1) I am conscious of this chair. (2) There is consciousness
of this chair.
The answer is clear now. The sentence (1) was made through
the synthesis of ‘I’ at the site of universalizing synthesis in the
level of impure reﬂection, and the sentence (2) was made by the
purifying reﬂection through the phenomenological reduction of
the ‘I’ of the sentence (1).
This mechanism would shed new light on the problem of
variable (multi-faced) relations between cognitive contents and
their linguistic expressions.
CONSTRAINTS (ALIENATION) BY
LANGUAGE AND LIBERATION FROM
THEM
I ask myself: can you create your own language as a natural
language (including lexis, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics) ex
nihilo? My answer should be ‘no’ or ‘impossible.’
I feel myself deeply situated in my mother tongue. I am tightly
coupled with it. I cannot ﬂee from it. Of course, I can make some
neologies using my linguistic knowledge of preﬁxes, suﬃxes, and
roots of words. But they are not pure creation; they are still rooted
in my mother tongue. As Sartre (2004, 2010a) said in the quotes
above, language is a product of human history, and presupposes
the existence of other people; it is the being-for-others. And it
exists as its totality as a set of internal objective senses; words and
sentences are in their tight connections against the background
of a whole of language (Sartre, 2004, p. 99). These must be the
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main reason why the creation of language as a natural language
by individual persons is impossible.
On the other hand, there is a moment when I have a sense
of alienation even from my mother tongue. It is the time when
it cannot serve me to precisely express my deep experience. I
feel I need more adequate words and syntax. This feeling could
be the same as that of the black people born and brought up
in French in France, which Sartre described as ‘negritude’ in his
“Black Orpheus” (Sartre, 2008, pp. 279–280).
There is no way they will speak their negritude with precise,
eﬀective words that hit their target. There is no way they will speak
their negritude in prose. But everyone knows that this sense of
failure with regard to language considered as a means of direct
expression is at the origin of all poetic experience.
The speaker’s reaction to the failure of prose is, in fact, what
Bataille calls the holocaust of words. So long as we are able
to believe that a pre-established harmony governs the relations
betweenwords andBeing, we use words without seeing them, with
a blind conﬁdence. They are sense-organs, mouths and hands,
windows opened on the world. At the ﬁrst failure, this easy chatter
falls away from us; we see the whole system; it is nothing but a
broken, upturned machinery, its great arms still waving to signal
in the void. We judge at a stroke the mad enterprise of naming.
(italics in original; boldface by s.i.)
We see words, once in harmony with us, now as “the
mad enterprise of naming between words and Being [entity
in general].” This is the feeling that I can sense even in my
mother tongue. Should I go into the world of poem as the quote
connotes? No, it could not be practical for scientiﬁc and everyday
use of language.
I wrote above: naming can be dangerously a multi-faced
project. It “can lie, deceive, distort, and make unwarranted
generalizations” (Sartre, 2010a, p. 372). This shows that in a sense,
naming can be arbitrary between words and Being at the site
of naming in the impure reﬂection. We can take advantage of
that multi-faced character of naming for ‘precise and eﬀective’
naming. Although language creation ex nihilo is impossible, if we
pay close attention to the characters of Being and words in the
site of naming, it can serve to improve our naming power.
It should be warned again that naming is brought forth in
impure reﬂection, which can also be used as the site of forgery.
That is why we need the purifying reﬂection to be able to aﬃrm
the sure and certain content to our consciousness. Only after
understanding this, we can say, as Laing and Cooper (1971,
p. 19) wrote, “language must be pressed into service even if this
involves turning language against itself, exploiting its deﬁciencies,
its vagueness, and its contradictions.”
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